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DUE-ON-SALE CLAUSES AND CLOGGING THE
EQUITY OF REDEMPTION
With the advent of the rising money market' the use of due-on clauses
in mortgages and deeds of trust has become increasingly prevalent.2 A due-
on clause provides for the automatic or optional acceleration of the balance
owing on a mortgage debt in the event of sale, encumbrance or other
disposition of the underlying security.' Generally, the money-lending in-
dustry utilizes two types of due-on clauses, the more common due-on-sale
clause4 and the due-on-encumbrance clause.5 The event which prompts the
operation of the clauses distinguishes them. Due-on clauses serve primar-
ily as risk averters for lenders who wish to protect themselves against
fluctuations in market interest rates,7 although proponents of the clauses
advance other justifications." The clauses have come under critical scru-
I Throughout the 1950's and until the mid-1960's interest rates for mortgage loans re-
mained fairly stable, with increases in the rates being slow and steady. Bartke & Tagaropulos,
Michigan's Looking Glass World of Due-On-Sale Clauses, 24 WAYNE L. REV. 971, 975-77
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Bartke & Tagaropulos]. The interest rate for real estate transac-
tions remained stable at 6% from the middle of 1961 until the end of 1965, at which time a
credit crisis affected the market dramatically with interest rates increasing at an unusually
fast rate and credit becoming tight. Id. at 977 & 977 n.18.
I Due-on clauses originally were included in the mortgages as additional protection for
the lender's security interest. Lending institutions which faced rising interest rates experi-
enced liquidity problems and consequently their ability to continue making loans was im-
paired. Bartke & Tagaropulos, supra note 1, at 978-79. As a means of increasing earning
capacity, the lending insitutions began to invoke the due-on clauses contained in the mort-
gages. Id. at 979; see Bonanno, Due on Sale and Prepayment Clauses in Real Estate Financing
in California in Times of Fluctuating Interest Rates-Legal Issues and Alternatives, 6 U. SAN.
FRAN. L. REv. 267, 267-71 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Bonanno]. See also Bonanno, supra
at 271-74 (historical background of use and development of due-on-sale clauses); Volkmer,
The Application of the Restraints On Alienation Doctrine to Real Property Security Interests,
58 IowA L. REV. 747, 769 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Volkmer].
Bonanno, supra note 2, at 272; Comment, Judicial Treatment of the Due-on-Sale
Clause: The Case for Adopting Standards of Reasonableness and Unconscionability, 27 STAN.
L. REV. 1109, 1110 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Judicial Treatment of the Due-on-Sale
Clausel.
The sale of the property which stands as security for a loan invokes the operation of a
due-on-sale clause. See Bonanno, supra note 2, at 272; Judicial Treatment of the Due-on-
Sale Clause, supra note 3, at 1110 n.5.
I The due-on-encumbrance clause becomes operable upon the placement of any en-
cumbrances on the secured property subsequent to the execution of the governing agreement.
See La Sala v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 5 Cal. 3d 864, 489 P.2d 1113, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849
(1971); Bonanno, supra note 2, at 272 & 272 n.14; Judicial Treatment of the Due-on-Sale
Clause, supra note 3, at 1110 n.5.
See notes 4-5 supra.
See note 2 supra. The lender protects itself with the due-on clause during periods of
declining interest rates as well as during periods of rising rates. Attaching prepayment and/or
assumption fees as conditions for tranfer afford such protection, thus enabling the lender to
avoid loss of the interest income anticipated at the inception of the original loan. See
generally Bonanno, supra note 2, at 270-71; text accompanying notes 17-21 infra.
I Proponents of the due-on clause argue that the clause provides protection against
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tiny because of the harsh results involved for the borrower-homeowner who
is unable to satisfy the balance owing on the mortgage or to secure new
financing of the debt.9 A lender's exercise of the option to accelerate the
outstanding debt may interfere directly with the homeowner's right to sell
his property if a potential buyer is unwilling to purchase the property
unless the lender permits the buyer to assume the existing mortgage. 0
Additionally, the use of due-on clause is likely to foster a situation in which
the borrower-homeowner is restrained economically from alienating his
property if he is unable to meet the lender's conditions for transfer." Such
conditions may include a prepayment penalty, 2 an assumption fee, 3 an
increased interest charge after transfer" or any combination of these penal-
ties."5
impairment or waste of the underlying security. See Baker v. Loves Park Say. & Loan Ass'n,
21 Ill. App. 3d 42, 45, 314 N.E.2d 306, 308 (1974) (utility of restraint in enabling lender to
monitor possessor or property in determining ability to keep the property in repair, outweighs
injurious consequences); Volkmer, supra note 2, at 769-70. But see Valensi, The Due On Sale
Clause-A Dissenting Opinion, 45 L.A. BuLL. 121, 121, 123 (1970) (primary purpose of due-
on clause is regulation of interest rates; impairment of security is collateral purpose). See
generally G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 5.21 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as OSBORNE].
' See Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, 21 Cal. 3d 943, 950, 582 P.2d 970, 974, 148 Cal.
Rptr. 379, 383 (1978).
10 See Judicial Treatment of the Due-on-Sale Clause, supra note 3, at 1113. Additionally,
if assumption is permitted only upon the condition of a higher interest rate, the purchaser
may force the homeowner to lower the selling price of the property, forcing a "loss" onto the
homeowner. Id.; Note, The Case For Relief From Due-On-Sale Provisions: A Note To Hell-
baurn v. Lytton Savings And Loan Association, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 431, 436 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as Case for Reliefl. See generally Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, 21 Cal. 3d 943, 950,
582 P.2d 970, 974-75, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379, 383 (1978) (economic impact of due-on clauses on
borrower-mortgagors).
1 See Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, 21 Cal. 3d 943,-, 582 P.2d 970, 974-75, 148
Cal. Rptr. 379, 383 (1978); Judicial Treatment of the Due-on-Sale Clause, supra note 3, at
1113; note 10 supra.
12 A lender may charge a prepayment "penalty" against a debtor who seeks to pay off
an indebtedness prematurely, thus denying the lender of potential interest earnings. See
Bloomfield Sav. Bank v. Howard S. Stainton & Co., 60 N.J. Super. 524, 159 A.2d 443 (1960)
(approving prepayment penalty).
13 A lender may charge a homeowner-borrower's grantee an "assumption fee" for the
privilege of assuming the grantor's mortgage. This fee often is defended as a necessary admin-
istrative charge to defray cost incurred when a new borrower assumes a mortgage. See Hell-
baum v. Lytton Say. & Loan Ass'n, 274 Cal. App. 2d 456, 79 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1969) (assumption
fee of five percent assessed as condition to assume). See generally Case for Relief, supra note
10, at 434-37.
" Rising interest rates in the market as a whole, see text accompanying notes 1-2 supra,
have made commonplace the increase of interest rates as a condition for assumption by
grantees. See, e.g., Gunther v. White, - Tenn. - , 489 S.W.2d 529 (1973); Mutual Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Wisconsin Wire Works, 58 Wis. 2d 99, 205 N.W.2d 762 (1973).
" See, e.g., Malouff v. Midland Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 181 Colo. 294, 509 P.2d 1240
(1973) (sale approved on condition of executing "assumption and Modification Agreement"
raising interest rate from seven to eight percent); Baltimore Life Ins. Co. v. Ham, 15 Ariz.
App. 78, 486 P.2d 190 (1971) (mortgage provided for prepayment penalty and acceleration);
Cherry v. Home Say. & Loan Ass'n, 276 Cal. App. 2d 574, 81 Cal. Rptr. 135 (Ct. App. 1969)
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Opponents of the clauses attack their validity by arguing that they
violate the common law prohibition of restraining the alienation of land.'
Historically, restraints on the alienation of property'7 have been opposed
for various reasons, such as their tendency to remove the property from
commerce'8 and to discourage property improvements." The majority of
courts have viewed all such restraints as void unless they qualify for specif-
ically defined exceptions. 0 A minority view, however, ruled restraints void
(savings & loan refused consent of proposed sale unless grantee agreed to pay assumption fee
and higher interest rate).
1' See, e.g., Coast Bank v. Minderhout, 61 Cal. 2d 311, 392 P.2d 265, 38 Cal. Rptr. 505
(1964); Malouff v. Midland Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 181 Colo. 294, 509 P.2d 1240 (1973);
Crockett v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 289 N.C. 620, 224 S.E.2d 580 (1976).
At common law, any and all restraints on the alienation of land generally were void.
Sanders v. Hicks, 317 So. 2d 61, 63 (Miss. 1975). The basis for this rule was the social and
economic desirability of giving an owner of a fee simple in land the power to transfer his
interest. Schnebly, Restraints Upon the Alienation of Legal Interests: 1, 44 YALE L.J. 961, 961
(1934) [hereinafter cited as Schnebly]. The rule against restraints is aimed primarily at
attempts to render vested interests inalienable. Id. at 963; see text accompanying notes 18-
20 infra. See generally, 3 L. SIMEs & A. SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 1111, 1114,
1133 (2d ed. 1956) [hereinafter cited as SIMEs & SMrrH]; see also 3 SIMES & SMrrH, supra §
1153 (consent of third party condition to alienation).
7 Restraints on alienation of property may take various forms and generally are classified
as either disabling, forfeiture or promissory restraints. See 3 SImES & SMITH, supra note 11, §
1131. Disabling restraints withhold the power to convey from the grantee, while forfeiture
restraints go even further in purportedly divesting the grantee of his title upon an attempted
alienation. A.CASNER & W. LEACH, CASES AND TEXT ON PROPERTY 1008 (2d ed. 1979). Valid
promissory restraints are consensual agreements which are specifically enforceable. Id. The
due-on clause does not fit precisely into any of these classifications because, although consen-
sual, the clause has not been found to be specifically enforceable but rather merely a legiti-
mate justification for acceleration of the mortgage debt. See Coast Bank v. Minderhout, 61
Cal. 2d 311, 316, 391 P.2d 265, 268, 38 Cal. Rptr. 505, 508 (1964) (doubt as to enforceability
of due-on-sale clause by injunction, specific performance or action for damages). See
generally Volkmer, supra note 2, at 748-53, 768-70 (summary of restraint classification and
analysis of due-on clause as analogous to forfeiture restraint).
11 While objection to keeping property out of commerce is most important when there is
a shortage of marketable properties, Schnebly, supra note 16, at 964, the restraint also would
tend to stagnate the economy if buying and selling were discouraged. See 3 SIMEs & SMITH,
supra note 16, § 1135. See generally Judicial Treatment of the Due-on-Sale Clause, supra note
3, at 1113 n.16; Comment, Coast Bank v. Minderhout And The Reasonable Restraint On
Alienation: Creature of Commercial Ambiguity, 12 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 954, 956-57 n.14 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as Commercial Ambiguityl.
11 Schnebly, supra note 11, at 964. The effect of a restraint to discourage improvement
of property because of the inability of the owner to sell and realize a profit has been noted as
the chief objection to restraints, especially since maximum utilization of the land subject to
a restraint is virtually impossible. Id. at 964 n.17.
" See Bernhard, The Minority Doctrine Concerning Direct Restraints on Alienation, 57
MICH. L. REV. 1173, 1174 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Bernhardl.
Among the interests which have been recognized as justifiable restraints on alienation
are spendthrift trusts, leases for terms of years, life estates and executory land contracts. See
Coast Bank v. Minderhout, 61 Cal. 2d 311, 316, 392 P.2d 265, 268, 38 Cal. Rptr. 505, 508
(1964); Schnebly, supra note 17, at 989-93.
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only if unreasonable.
2 '
In addition to the common law doctrine opposing alienation restraints,
the common law doctrine which prohibits clogging"2 the equity of redemp-
tion 3 is adaptable to due-on clause analysis. The equity of redemption
represents the right of the mortgagor after default to perform his obliga-
tions under the mortgage prior to a valid foreclosure sale, thereby having
title restored to him free of the mortgage. Although rarely discussed in
American judicial decisions,2 the anti-clogging doctrine prohibits, among
other things, the "fettering away" of a mortgagor's equity of redemption,
2
an arguably unavoidable consequence when mortgage terms include a due-
on clause.?
The first judicial treatment and approval of due-on clauses came in
1964 with the California Supreme Court decision of Coast Bank v.
Minderhout.11 Coast Bank involved foreclosure of an equitable mortgage,
2 9
the existence of which the defendant-transferees contested." The court
21 Bernhard, supra note 20, at 1174. The minority position viewed a restraint as reasona-
ble if the justification for the restraint outweighed the actual resulting restraint. Id. at 1177:
cf. Baker v. Loves Park Say. & Loan Ass'n, 21 Ill. App. 3d 42, 45, 314 N.E.2d 306, 309 (1974)
("consent to sale" clause found enforceable since utility of restraint outweighed injurious
consequences).
21 A clog is an impairment of the mortgagor's right to the equity of redemption. Santley
v. Wilde, [18991 2 Ch. 474, 475, 478; Bacon v. Bacon, 21 Eng. Rep. (1639); OSBORNE, supra
note 8, § 3.1; text accompanying notes 84-86 infra.
See.Williams, Clogging The Equity of Redemption, 40 W. VA. L.Q. 31, 36-37 (1933)
[hereinafter cited as Williams]; OSBORNE, supra note 8, § 3.1.
21 OSBORNE, supra note 8, § 7.1; see Burgess v. Wheate, 28 Eng. Rep. 652, 670 (Ch. 1759)
(equity of redemption descends, may be granted, devised and entailed).
1 But see Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Doerr, 123 N.J. Super. 530, 303 A.2d 898 (1973)
(doctrine of clogging examined in context of lease and leaseback transaction).
2' See Santley v. Wilde, [18981 2 Ch. 474, 475 (explanation of clog or fetter on mortga-
gor's equity of redemption). See generally The Conveyancer, 177 L.T. 361 (1934).
" See text accompanying notes 83-98 infra.
2 61 Cal. 2d 311, 392 P.2d 265, 38 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1964). See generally Commercial
Ambiguity, supra note 18.
21 61 Cal. 2d 311, 313, 392 P.2d 265, 266-67, 38 Cal. Rptr. 505, 506 (1964). The plaintiff-
bank made several loans to Burton and Donald Enright for the improvement of property they
owned. In addition to executing a promissory note for the indebtedness, the parties executed
a separate instrument containing a provision in which the borrowers agreed not to encumber
or transfer their property without the lender's consent. The provision further provided that
if the borrower did not abide by the agreement, the lender could accelerate the balance at
its discretion. Id. at 313, 392 P.2d at 266 & 266 n.2, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 506.
Without the consent or knowledge of the bank, the Enrights conveyed the property to
the defendants. Id. at 313, 392 P.2d at 266, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 506. The bank apparently
exercised its option to accelerate the due date for the outstanding debt, but was unable to
collect the unpaid balance. Id. Subsequently, the bank sought to foreclose the equitable
mortgage which it maintained the instrument created. Id.; text accompanying notes 44-48
infra
20 61 Cal. 2d 311, 314, 392 P.2d 265, 267, 38 Cal. Rptr. 505, 507 (1964). The defendants
maintained that the bank extended unsecured credit to the Enrights while retaining the right
to withdraw the credit if the property was conveyed or encumbered in contravention of the
agreement which the parties executed. Id.
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determined, however, that the inclusion of the due-on clause evidenced the
intention of the parties to create an equitable mortgage." Responding to
the court's determination that the instrument did in fact create an equita-
ble mortgage,32 the defendants contended that the instrument was ineffec-
tive because the due-on-sale clause constituted an invalid restraint on
alienation.3 The circuity of the Coast Bank decision becomes apparent
with the realization that the due-on clause in the governing instrument
served as the basis for the court's finding that the parties intended to
create a security interest in the property34 and, therefore, that the instru-
ment created an equitable mortgage.? Simply, the court ruled that the
instrument created an equitable mortgage relying on the inclusion of the
due-on provision, which was valid because it operated within the context
of an equitable mortgage protecting the lender's security.3' Had the court
found the clause to be an invalid, and consequently inoperable, restraint
on alienation, the basis for the mortgage would have been invalidated.
37
The situation that arose in Coast Bank was attributable to the common
desire of the lending industry to avoid the antideficiency judgment legisla-
tion then effective in California.? Generally, anti-deficiency judgment leg-
islation restricts creditors' rights to enforce mortgage debts, and conse-
quently is disfavored by institutional lenders. 9 The statutory enactments
in California may limit the creditor's right to a judgment for a deficiency
if the security should prove insufficient to satisfy the debt.4' In an attempt
to escape the restrictions of the anti-deficiency judgment statutes when
31 Id.
32 Id.
Id. at 314, 392, P.2d at 267-68, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 507.
Id. at 314, 392 P.2d at 267, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 507; see Commercial Ambiguity, supra
note 13, at 958-59 n.29.
61 Cal. 2d 311, 314, 392 P.2d 265, 267, 38 Cal. Rptr. 505, 507 (1964).
" See text accompanying notes 34-37 supra.
31 See Commercial Ambiguity, supra note 13, at 958-59 & 959 n.30 (procedural technique
of Coast Bank court questioned).
u Unless a statute provides otherwise, a creditor secured by a deed of trust or mortgage
on real property is entitled to recover the full amount of the outstanding debt upon the
debtor's default. Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighino, 378 P.2d 97, 98, 27 Cal. Rptr. 873, 874 (1963).
The creditor may choose to satisfy the debt by realizing on the security or directly suing the
debtor on the obligation, or both. Id. Most states, however, have enacted legislation restrict-
ing the creditor's right to enforce such debts. Id. In California, the statutory enactments
which govern in the event that the security is insufficient to satisfy the debt may limit the
creditor's right to a judgment for the deficiency, id., hence the term "anti-deficiency" legisla-
tion. See CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 580a, 580b, 580d, 726; Hetland, Real Property and Real
Property Security: The Well-Being of the Law, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 151, 159-65 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as Hetland] (antideficiency legislation and related case law); Hetland,
Deficiency Judgment Limitations in California-A New Judicial Approach, 51 CALIF. L. REV.
1, 1-7, 28, 35-37 (1963) (legislative purpose in promulgating anti-deficiency statutes); Riesen-
feld, California Legislation Curbing Deficiency Judgments, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 705, 705-07
(1960) (history, nature and scope of legislation).
31 See note 38 supra.
40 Id.
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advantageous,4" California lenders avoided the absolute classification of
their interests as secured or unsecured by creating a "masked security
device. 4 2 The borrower normally would desire a determination that the
governing instrument was in fact a mortgage so to acquire the protections
of the antideficiency judgment statutes.43 In the Coast Bank setting, how-
ever, the lender benefitted from the foreclosure on the property following
the finding that an equitable mortgage existed."
The Coast Bank context justifies the court's determination since a
contrary decision would prove burdensome to the future debtor seeking the
statutory protections provided by the legislature.45 Furthermore, the na-
ture of the loan provides support for the Coast Bank decision because the
advances were made for improvements on the subject property" and argua-
bly the original borrower's interest in the condition of the property is
diminished upon the transfer of the property to a third party.4" Therefore,
although the lending industry subjected its instruments to classification as
mortgages which were thus susceptible to the anti-deficiency statutes, the
effect of the court's ruling on the validity of due-on clauses was, in fact, to
the lender's advantage."8
In upholding the validity of the due-on-sale clause, the Coast Bank
court noted that not all restraints are invalid." The court emphasized that
in several instances, courts had found restraints to be reasonable when the
proponents could demonstrate a justifiable interest which warranted the
protection afforded by the restraint."0 Accordingly, the Coast Bank court
concluded that the constraints of the due-on-sale clause were not unrea-
sonable conditions to impose, in exchange for the bank's continued exten-
sion of credit to the original borrower.5 Consequently, the court approved
,1 Since the anti-deficiency legislation curbs the creditor's right to a deficiency judgment
with transactions involving deed of trust and mortgages, see CAL. CODE Civ. Paoc. § 580b,
580c, the lender, by structuring transactions without formal deed of trust or mortgage instru-
ments, stood to benefit if exempted from the statutory dictates. See Hetland, supra note 38,
at 167-70.
12 See Hetland, supra note 38, at 167.
43 Id.
" 61 Cal. 2d 311, 316, 392 P.2d 265, 268, 38 Cal. Rptr. 505, 508 (1964); see Hetland, supra
note 38, at 167; note 29 supra.
4 See Hetland, supra note 38, at 167-71.
4' 61 Cal. 2d 311, 313, 392 P.2d 265, 266, 38 Cal. Rptr. 505, 506 (1964); see text accompa-
nying note 51 infra.
11 See Coast Bank v. Minderhout, 61 Cal. 2d 311, 316, 392 P.2d 265, 268, 38 Cal. Rptr.
505, 508 (1964); Hetland, supra note 38, at 170.
11 See Hetland, supra note 38, at 170-71; text accompanying note 43 supra.
,9 Hetland, supra note 38, at 170-71.
50 Id., see Commercial Ambiguity, supra note 18, at 955-58; note 20 supra.
1' 61 Cal. 2d 311, 316, 392 P.2d 265, 268, 38 Cal. Rptr. 505, 508 (1964). While the court's
decision did not emphasize the difference between a loan for property improvement and a
purchase money mortgage, the distinction should be considered. With a purchase money
mortgage, the money lent is tied intimately to the land and the land itself can answer for
any default in payment by the mortgagor through foreclosure proceedings. See OSBORNE supra
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the acceleration of the debt and subsequent foreclosure of the mortgage."2
More importantly for the commercial lender, however, the due-on-sale
clause received judicial recognition as a potentially reasonable restraint on
alienation.53
Judicial treatment of the due-on clause since Coast Bank has focused
on the restraint on alienation aspect of the clause.54 Courts have tended
either to be lender-oriented, with the onus on the borrower to demonstrate
that the operation of the due-on clause is unconscionable or inequitable, 5
or borrower-oriented, with the burden resting on the lender to establish
justifiable interests which render the operation of the clause to be reasona-
ble.51 No jurisdiction has declared a due-on clause invalid per se, 57 although
recent decisions by the Arizona and California Supreme Courts have indi-
cated an increasing disdain for the clause and its underlying policies.
Perhaps the most intriguing judicial treatment of the due-on clause
during the last fifteen years originated in the California courts.55 The Cali-
note 9, § 1.1. In contrast, the loan made for property improvement does not have the built-
in security of the purchase money mortgage, thus requiring the lender to depend more heavily
upon the character of the debtor as protection for its extension of credit. Cf. U.C.C. § 9-107
(purchase money security interest).
51 61 Cal. 2d 311, 316, 392 P.2d 265, 268, 38 Cal. Rptr. 505, 508 (1964).
5 See id. The court expressed doubt as to the success a lender, who sought specific
performance of the borrower's promise not to transfer property, might have, recognizing this
situation as a potentially unreasonable restraint on alienation. Id. See generally Hetland,
supra note 38, at 170.
-4 See Continental Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Fetter, 564 F.2d 1013, 1017 n.4 (10th 1974)
(judicial treatment of due-on-sale clauses); note 12 supra.
- The lender-oriented position displays a keen awareness of the lender's economic con-
siderations in a market of rising interest rates. See, e.g., Cherry v. Home Say. & Loan Ass'n,
276 Cal. App. 2d 574, 81 Cal. Rptr. 135, 138-39 (Ct. App. 1969) (disapproved in Wellenkamp);
Malouff v. Midland Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 181 Colo. 294,-, 509 P.2d 1240, 1244-45
(1973); Century Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Van Glahn, 144 N.J. Super. 48, 364 A.2d 558, 561-
62 (1976); Mutual Real Estate Inv. Trust v. Buffalo Say. Bank, 90 Misc. 2d 675, 395 N.Y.S.2d
583, 585-86 (1977). See generally Bartke & Tagaropulos, supra note 1, at 984-85, 988.
5, See, e.g., Baltimore Life Ins. Co. v. Ham, 15 Ariz. App. 78, 80, 486 P.2d 190, 192 (1971)
(underlying reason for clause goes to responsibility of party in possession; exercise must be
reasonable on face); Tucker v. Pulaski Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 252 Ark. 849, 481 S.W.2d 725
(1972) (grounds for invocation of due-on clause must be reasonable on face); La Sala v.
American Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 5 Cal. 3d 864, 868, 489 P.2d 1113, 1121, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849, 854
(1971) (exercise of due-on-encumbrance clause must be reasonably necessary to protect secu-
rity).
11 Barke & Tagaropulos, supra note 1, at 984-85. Nineteen states have addressed the due-
on-sale clause controversy. Id. at 985.
" See Patton v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 118 Ariz. 473, 578 P.2d 152 (1978) (enforce-
ment of due-on-sale clause requires showing that nonenforcement will jeopardize security);
Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, 21 Cal. 3d 953, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978)
(assumes borrower oriented position by requiring showing of justification for enforcement of
clause); Comment, Arizona, California High Courts Adopt Minority View Re Due-on-Sale
Clause Enforcement, 54 LEGAL BuLL. 370 (1978).
3, After Coast Bank, the due-on-clause conflict was addressed again in Hellbaum v.
Lytton Say. & Loan Ass'n, 274 Cal. App. 2d 456, 79 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1969). Hellbaum, the
borrower's successor, sued the lender for allegedly negligent processing of the successor's
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application for assumption by the successor's transferee of the balance owing on the bor-
rower's secured note. Id. at 458, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 10. The instruments governing the original
transaction contained a clause providing for a prepayment fee which was expressly applicable
to any early payment that the borrowers might be obligated to pay under the instrument's
due-on clause. Id. The borrower's successor contracted to sell the subject property, applying
to the lender for approval of'the assumption since the transferee was unable to meet the
financial burden of prepayment fees in addition to loan fees which would be incurred upon
refinancing. Id. The lender approved the assumption provided that a five percent assumption
fee would be paid, causing the transferee to withdraw from the transaction. Id. The successor
then defaulted and the property was sold at a trustee's sale, at which time the successor sued
for damages representing the difference between what would have been realized on the pro-
posed sale and amount owed under the promissory note. Id.
The successors conceded that under Coast Bank, the due-on clause was a reasonable
restraint on alienation so long as the restraint protected the justifiable interest of the lender
in "maintaining the direct responsibility of the parties on whose credit the loan was made."
Id. at 459, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 11. The successors contended, however, that the combination of
the lender's right to accelerate and to charge a prepayment fee upon acceleration constituted
an unlawful restraint on alienation. Id. The court held that the lender had a justifiable
interest in discouraging early payment. Because of this interest and the previously acknowl-
edged justifiable interest of borrower identity, the terms of the instrument did not constitute
an unreasonable restraint on alienation. Id.
Shortly after Heilbaum, the court decided another due-on case, Cherry v. Home Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 276 Cal. App. 2d 574, 81 Cal. Rptr. 135 (1969). The court in Cherry gave the
lender essentially unbridled power to avail itself of the due-on clause benefits. See text
accompanying notes 60-63 infra.
The decision of La Sala v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 5 Cal. 3d 864, 489 P.2d 1113, 97
Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971), exposed to judicial scrutiny the questions raised by a due-on-
encumbrance clause. The borrowers in La Sala brought a class action seeking a declaration
of the invalidity of the clause which permitted acceleration if the borrower executed a junior
encumbrance on the secured property. Id. at 864, 489 P.2d at 1113, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 849.
Without holding the clause invalid per se, the court concluded that the legality of enforcing
the clause would depend upon the necessity of protecting the lender's security through en-
forcement. Id at 882, 489 P.2d at 1121, 1125, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 859. Thus, the court denied the
lenders automatic performance of due-on-encumbrance clauses, while preserving such per-
formance of due-on-sale clauses. Id. at 887, 489 P.2d at 1126, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 863; see id. at
880 n.17, 489 P.2d at 1125 n.17, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 859 n.17.
The California courts' first serious opposition to the due-on-sale clause came in the 1974
decision of Tucker v. Lassen Say. & Loan Ass'n, 12 Cal. 3d 629, 526 P.2d 1169, 116 Cal. Rptr.
(1974). The instrument governing the transactions provided for the assessment of prepayment
penalties and acceleration as in Helibaum. The execution of an installment land contract by
the borrowers and their tenants prompted acceleration of the balance. Id. at 631, 526 P.2d at
1170, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 634. In an extension of the La Sala court's balance of the necessity of
protection against the effect of restraint, the Tucker court explored the distinctions between
an installment loan contract and an outright sale, see id. at 639, 526 P.2d at 1175, 116 Cal.
Rptr. at 639. Demonstration of a threat to a lender's legitimate interest must be made for
the court to validate enforcement of a due-on clause. Id.
The California court thus laid the groundwork for overruling the Coast Bank decision,
and pursued this goal in Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, 21 Cal. 3d 953, 582 P.2d 970, 148
Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978), the latest California decision to discuss the due-on clause controversy.
The borrower's transferee challenged the enforcement of a due-on-sale clause following an
outright sale, id. at 946, 582 P.2d at 972, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 382, upon the bank's conditioning
its forebearance of acceleration on an increase in the loan interest rate from 8% to 9 1/4 %. Id.
The California Supreme Court accepted the transferee's arguments, holding that a due-on
clause cannot be enforced upon an outright sale unless the lender demonstrates the necessity
of enforcement to protect against impairment to the security or the risk of default. Id. at 953,
582 P.2d at 976-77, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
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fornia courts extended the decision of Coast Bank to the point of virtually
unchallengeable acceptance of the due-on clause with the decision of
Cherry v. Home Savings & Loan Association." The lender in Cherry
charged an assumption fee in addition to increasing the interest rate on
the loan, as conditions precedent to consenting to a property transfer." The
borrowers and their transferees, as appellants, contended that the lender
was required to act reasonably in withholding consent to transfer the prop-
erty."2 After reciting business justifications for the due-on clause, the court
ruled that the lender had the discretionary right to exercise its option and
was under no obligation to act reasonably."
The California court qualified the position assumed in Cherry, how-
ever, when the validity of a due-on-encumbrance clause was questioned. 4
The court applied further restrictions to the Cherry holding when a bor-
rower who alienated his property by means of an installment land contract
challenged the operation of the due-on-sale clause. 5 Finally, in the most
recent California decision to examine the force and effect of a due-on-sale
clause, Wellenkamp v. Bank of America,"6 the court assumed a borrower-
oriented position, holding that a due-on clause is unenforceable upon out-
right sale unless the lender demonstrates the necessity of its enforcement.
7
Thus, the Wellenkamp decision substantially erodes the once-favored sta-
tus of the due-on clause in California."
Examination of the other jurisdictions which have considered the due-
on clause question since Coast Bank reveals a divergence similar to that
demonstrated by the California courts." While the majority of jurisdictions
The Wellenkamp court stated expressly that the maintenance of the lender's portfolio
at current legal rates was an insufficient interest to justify the exercise of a due-on-sale clause.
Id. at 953, 582 P.2d at 976, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 385. In addition, the court noted that the lender
should bear the risk of economic fluctuation and should protect itself against such a risk when
making the loan. Id. While minimizing the effect that a transfer of the property involved
might have on a lender, the court maximized the potential harm to the borrower by restrain-
ing alienation. Id. The court emphasized that the borrower should not bear the harm of the
lender's "mistaken projections." Id. See generally Note, The Demise Of The Due-On-Sale
Clause, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 573, 576-79 (1976); Case for Relief, supra note 10, at 435-39.
80 276 Cal. App. 2d 574, 81 Cal. Rptr. 135 (Ct. App. 1969).
66 Id. at 575, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 136-37.
'2 Id. at 575, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 137.
Id. at 576, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 139.
11 See La Sala v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 5 Cal. 3d 864, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849, 489 P.2d
1113 (1971); note 59 supra.
0 See Tucker v. Lassen Say. & Loan Ass'n, 12 Cal. 3d 629, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633, 526 P.2d
1169 (1964); note 59 supra.
66 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978); see Note, Wellenkamp v. Bank
of America: Invalidation of Automatically Enforceable Due-on-Sale Clauses, 67 CALIF. L.
REv. 886 (1979); note 59 supra.
61 21 Cal. 3d 943, 953, 582 P.2d 970, 976-77, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 385; see note 59 supra.
19 See note 59 supra. But see Medovoi v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 89 Cal. App. 3d
875, 152 Cal. Rptr. 572 (1979)" (California Supreme Court ordered that opinion not be officially
published) (limits Wellenkamp to voluntary transfers of secured property).
11 In Cherry, the California court rendered its most extreme pro-lender opinion when the
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have been lenient in enforcing due-on clauses, few have been as lender
oriented as New Jersey 0 or Tennessee.7 In Century Federal Savings &
Loan Association v. Van Glahn,72 a New Jersey court held the lender's
intent to maintain portfolio interest rates to be a legitimate exercise of a
due-on-sale clause. Notwithstanding the holding in Van Glahn regarding
the lender's intent, the court stated that the legitimacy of a lender's motive
was an immaterial consideration when evaluating the enforceability of a
due-on clause. 73 Similarly in support of the lender position, the Tennessee
Supreme Court has stated that while due-on clauses would not be enforced
unequivocally, no imaginable justification existed for rendering the exer-
cise of an acceleration clause invalid by characterizing the exercise of a
due-on-sale clause as unconscionable or inequitable. 7 Absent fraud or un-
lender's interest rate increase was recognized as reasonable justification for the enforcement
of the due-on clause. Compare Cherry v. Home Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 276 Cal. App. 2d 574, 81
Cal. Rptr. 135 (Ct. App. 1969) with Malouff v. Midland Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 181 Colo.
294, 509 P.2d 1240 (1973) and Crockett v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 289 N.C. 620, 224
S.E.2d 580 (1976). In contrast to Cherry, the recent decision of Wellenkamp demonstrates
the California court's altered attitude with respect to due-on clauses. The Wellenkamp deci-
sion requires a showing that the mortgagee's security is jeopardized before the enforcement
of a due-on clause will be mandated. Compare Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, 21 Cal. 3d
943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978) with Tucker v. Pulaski Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n,
252 Ark. 849, 481 S.W.2d 725 (1972) and Baltimore Life Ins. Co. v. Ham, 15 Ariz. App. 78,
486 P.2d 190 (1971).
"' See Century Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Van Glahn, 144 N.J. Super. 48, 364 A.2d 558
(App. Div. 1976); text accompanying notes 72 & 73 infra.
71 See Gunther v. White, __ Tenn. __, 489 S.W.2d 529 (1973); text accompanying
note 74 infra.
71 144 N.J. Super. 48, 364 A.2d 558 (App. Div. 1976). The New Jersey court addressed
the question of whether an acceleration provided for in a due-on-sale acceleration clause was
valid and enforceable. The court upheld the acceleration as a legitimate and valid contrac-
tural term. Id. at __, 364 A.2d at 559-60. As further support for the lender's position, the
court stated that the motivations in exercising the provisions of the clause were immaterial
and that an improper motive would not necessarily invalidate a foreclosure action subsequent
to acceleration and default. Id. at -, 364 A.2d at 561. In addition, the court specifically
held that acceleration motivated by a desire to keep the lender's portfolio at current interest
rates was "eminently proper." Id.
73 Id.
" See Gunther v. White, - Tenn ... 489 S.W. 2d 529, 530-31 (1973). The
appellant-debtors in Gunther negotiated a sale of property encumbered by a deed of trust
and promissory note in favor of the appellees. Id. at 529. The agreement to purchase was
conditioned on the appellee consenting to an assumption of the obligation by the prospective
purchaser at the original 6 1/% interest rate. Id. The appellees chose to withhold consent
unless the interest rate was increased to 8%, causing the potential buyer to cancel the sale
transaction. Id. The appellants subsequently brought suit claiming that the appellees action
in withholding consent to transfer at 6 / % interest was a restraint of trade, was against
public policy and would unduly restrain appellants' right to sell and convey their property.
Id.
The court recognized the economic advantages and disadvantages to both parties in-
volved in a lender-borrower relationship, finding the lender's position to be more defensible
and worthy of support. Id. at 532. Since the rights of the parties had been fixed by contract,
the court declined to invalidate the contract or the acceleration simply because the lender
rather than the borrower would benefit from the increased interest rate. Id.
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conscionability in enforcement, these lender oriented jurisdictions appear
impervious to the arguments of an economically distraught borrower.1
5
In contrast to the lender oriented jurisdictions are those jurisdictions
which have embraced the arguments advanced by the consumer-
borrowers. 6 Among the jurisdictions espousing the borrower position are
Arkansas,77 Florida,78 and Oklahoma.7 9 In these borrower-oriented jurisdic-
tions the courts permit enforcement of due-on clauses only if acceleration
is reasonable under the circumstances of the case." The determination of
reasonableness is tied to a required showing of actual or probable injury
to the lender, absent enforcement of the clause. Once this determination
of reasonableness is made, an inquiry into the reasonableness of the re-
straint on alienation is academic only."' The Wellenkamp decision es-
pouses a philosophy aligned with these borrower-oriented jurisdictions.
2
Although the validity of the due-on clause has been disputed repeatedly
as an encroachment of the common law doctrine forbidding restraints on
the alienation of property,3 the clause has not been challenged as violative
of the common law doctrine which prohibits clogging" the equity of re-
7' For additional discussion of the fraud and unconscionability standards used as basis
for denial of due-on clause enforcement, see Malouff v. Midland Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 181
Colo. 294, -, 509 P.2d 1240, 1245 (1973) (effort to extract excessive interest rate unrelated
to current market rate might constitute unconscionable conduct, relieving borrower of effect
on due-on-sale clause); Mutual Real Estate Inv. Trust v. Buffalo Say. Bank, 90 Misc. 2d 675,
677, 395 N.Y.S.2d 583, 586 (1977) (lender's right to accelerate could be restrained if uncons-
cionable or unfair result); Crockett v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 289 N.C. 620, 629, 224
S.E.2d 580, 586 (1976) (absent allegations and proof that lender acted fraudulently, inequita-
bly, oppressively or unconscionably in demanding increased interest rate, exercise of due-on-
sale clause reasonable).
76 See text accompanying notes 56-57 supra, 77-80 infra.
n For an early decision espousing the borrower's position in a due-on clause controversy,
see Tucker v. Pulaski Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 252 Ark. 849, 481 S.W.2d 725 (1972). For the
enforcement of a due-on clause to be valid, the court required the invocation to be based on
reasonable grounds. Id. at 728. The court offered circumvention of the due-on clause's purpose
or impairment of the lender's security as reasonable to support enforcement. Id. at 729.
76 In Clark v. Lachenmeier, 237 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 1970), the court denied the lender's
foreclosure sought solely on the basis of a violation of a due-on clause where the lender was
not harmed.
"' In Continental Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Fetter, 564 P.2d 1013 (Okla. 1974), the court
held that charging an assumption fee of 1% was unreasonable and inequitable as a condition
precedent to transferring a mortgage which contained a due-on provision. The court reached
its conclusion after determining that there was not an express provision in the governing
instruments for a 1% transferring fee that the fee did not reflect the actual costs of transferring
the mortgage and that the transfer did not jeopardize the lender's security.
10 See note 56 supra.
' See text accompanying note 67 & notes 77-80 supra.
62 21 Cal. 3d 943, 453, 582 P.2d 970, 976-77, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
" See text accompanying notes 11-14 supra.
" See note 22 supra. See generally Williams, supra note 23, at 33-37 (theories on the
origin of doctrine opposing clogs). The most reasonable theory of the doctrine's origin is that
associated with a general theory of equity abhorring oppression. Id. at 36. Traditionally,
equity courts disfavored hard bargains in contracts and favored the weaker party to the
bargain. Id. at 36-37, 42-45, 45 n.80.
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demption.- The lack of such an analytical attack is attributable in part
to the sporadic application of the doctrine in American judicial history.
Such omission, however, should not prevent an examination of the doc-
trine with respect to the due-on clause and its operation. Basic to the
doctrine was the equity court's aim to prevent overreaching by a lender"
of a "necessitous borrower." 8 The equity court's belief that the borrower-
mortgagor should, in effect, be protected from himself and his lender
caused the court to disallow any action prior to, or contemporaneous with,
a mortgage agreement that tended to impair the mortgagor's right to the
equity of redemption. 9 The right to the equity of redemption has been
guarded closely since its development by the courts as a means to circum-
vent the strict foreclosure of law day." Essentially, the equity of redemp-
tion permits the mortgagor, after default, to perform the obligation under
the mortgage and then to hold the property free from the mortgage lien. 9'
Equity thus grants relief to the mortgagor because of the nature of the
transaction entitling the mortgagee to security only in the mortgagor's
land.12 Redemption rights accrue in anyone who has obtained an interest
from or through the mortgagor." As a result of the prohibition against
clogging, the equity courts historically have voided agreements which
"fettered away" the mortgagor's right" or which bestowed a collateral
advantage on the mortgagee at the expense of the mortgagor's equity of
redemption.1
5
From the mortgagor's viewpoint, the typical due-on clause routinely
included in a commercial lender's agreement clogs the equity of redemp-
See notes 23-24 supra.
, The doctrine aimed at preventing clogging has enjoyed extensive discussion in English
jurisprudence, see, e.g., Kreglinger v. New Patagonia Meat & Cold Storage Co., [19141 A.C.
25; Biggs v. Hoddinott, 2 Ch. 307 (1898); Mainland v. Upjohn, [1899] 41 Ch. D. 126;
Casborne v. Scarfe, 26 Eng. Rep. 377 (Ch. 1737); Jennings v. Ward, 23 Eng. Rep. 935 (Ch.
1705). However, American treatment of the doctrine, especially of late, has been cursory. See
OSBORNE, supra note 9, § 3.1. The doctrine was discussed in the New Jersey decision of
Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Doerr, 123 N.J. Super. 530, 303 A.2d 898 (Ch. Div. 1973). In
Doerr the court addressed the specific point of whether the doctrine bars a mortgagor's
guarantor from taking an option to purchase the property from the mortgagor, as part of the
original mortgage transaction. Id. at 540, 303 A.2d at 906. Relying on the clogging doctrine,
the court concluded that the equity of redemption was clogged, and denied enforcement of
the option provision. Id. at 540-44, 303 A.2d at 906-08.
" See Toomes v. Conset, 26 Eng. Rep. 952, 952-53 (Ch. 1745).
" See Williams, supra note 23, at 45 n.80.
" See Osborne, supra note 8, § 3.1.
'0 See Williams, supra note 23, at 42.
" See Osborne, supra note 8, § 3.1.
See Santley v. Wilde, [18991 2 Ch. 474, 474.
" See Osborne, supra note 8, § 7.2. See also Burgess v. Wheate, 28 Eng. Rep. 652, 670
(Ch. 1759).
" See Mainland v. Upjohn, [18891 41 Ch. D. 126, 137.
' See In re Edwards' Estate, [1861] 11 Ir. Ch. Rep. 367. But see Biggs v. Hoddinott,
[18981 2 Ch. 307, 322-23 (collateral advantage to mortgagee not forbidden so long as reasona-
ble trade bargain).
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tion.11 By preventing the transfer of the mortgagor's equity of redemption
on the terms with which he acquired that equity, the value of the right
diminishes and the equity of redemption is impaired." Clogging thus has
occurred and the common law doctrine is violated. 8 Accordingly, the sem-
inal decision of Coast Bank," while recognizing due-on clauses as reasona-
ble restraints on the alienation of property,00 induced the violation of
another equally revered doctrine of the common law. 10'
In retrospect, the decision of Coast Bank should be evaluated both in
terms of that which is stated expressly and that which is left unsaid. The
circuity of the court's reasoning in Coast Bank' 2 is important when deter-
mining the validity of its extension to the many jurisdictions which fol-
lowed the California court's lead when ruling on enforceability of due-on
clauses.' 3 Jurdisdictions which have adopted strong lender positions' 4
would do well to reconsider their philosophies, especially in light of the
California court's retreat from the virtually unquestioned approval of the
due-on clause to a more cautious reasonableness standard, requiring justi-
fication. 5 An awareness of the circumstances surrounding the Coast Bank
decision, particularly the anti-deficiency judgment legislation effective in
California, should motivate the courts to re-examine the prudence of es-
pousing the lender-oriented position encouraged by Coast Bank."'
SALLY P. FALK
" See text accompanying notes 97-98 supra.
" Since the mortgagor is prevented from transferring the subject property, and thus his
equity of redemption, at its true market value, see note 10 supra, the mortgagor has imposed
a reduction in value upon himself by agreeing to the due-on provision.
"See text accompanying note 97 supra.
" 61 Cal. 2d 311, 392 P.2d 265, 38 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1964); see text accompanying notes
29-37 supra.
' 61 Cal. 2d 311, 316, 392 P.2d 265, 268 38 Cal. Rptr. 505, 508 (1964).
,0, See text accompanying notes 83-95 supra.
102 See text accompanying notes 34-37 supra.
20 See note 59 supra.
104 See text accompanying notes 70-74 supra.
I's See text accompanying notes 59-68 supra.
IN See text accompanying notes 38-47 supra.
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